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The 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) respond to 
humanity’s challenge to live humanely, justly, sustainably and in peace on our 
interconnected globe. Pursuit of the Agenda is inevitably subject to forces that 
‘shake and stir’ it. Correspondingly, our analytical frameworks need to be 
shaken and stirred too, to be more perceptive and responsive to emergent 
objective threats, subjective fears, and their impacts. A human security 
perspective offers an essential complement to the thinking and action 
underway for the SDGs, because insecurities arise in diverse and fluctuating 
forms in the daily lives of most people, produced by local, national, 
international and global forces. The worldwide ‘shake and stir’ triggered by 
COVID-19 is a reminder of how serious and all-encompassing such disruption 
can be. A human security perspective should be added in and/or to SDGs 
planning and implementation, at country level and in multilateral arenas. The 
perspective can draw together many available tools and stimulate their use 
focused on recognising and managing threats in people’s daily lives, not least 
by increasing human resilience. This paper presents the approach’s rationale, 
certain components, and its relevance to the SDGs Agenda, then gives two 
extended case studies: first, from almost 20 years of experience with human 
security-related thinking and practice in Latvia, and, second, from the COVID-
19 pandemic and the resulting crises. It concludes with suggestions for UN 
organizations, governments, and policy researchers.  
Keywords 
Sustainable Development Goals, human security approach, human resilience, 
Latvia, COVID-19 crisis, social contract. 
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Adding human security and human resilience to help 
advance the SDGs agenda 
 
1 Introduction 
This paper considers whether and how the human security approach can 
complement the SDGs and Agenda 2030, helping to promote their attainment 
despite risks to humankind such as illustrated in the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Around 75 years ago, world leaders created the United Nations and adopted 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), in order to promote 
freedom from fear, freedom from want and the freedom to live in dignity.1 The 
notion of being free from fear, want and indignity was translated later into the 
concept of human security (UNDP 1994; CHS 2003; UN Secretary-General 
2010). Human security analysis puts people at centre-stage, by looking at 
threats to major values in their lives, not only threats to physical security. We 
suggest it can complement and assist the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) agenda, adding more depth and realism to its commitment “to leave 
no one behind”. This paper offers first, an overview of human security analysis 
in a way that seeks to underline its practical relevance in relation to that 
agenda; second, a case-study at national level, from Latvia, one of the countries 
that has given the most serious attention to both human security ideas and the 
SDGs and has developed strong emphases on supporting human resilience; 
third, application of the ideas to the COVID-19 pandemic and its challenges, 
including as experienced in Latvia; and fourth, some concluding suggestions. 
The paper is intended as a stimulus and source for policy practitioners; it is not 
written as a political economy of global human insecurity and does not attempt 
to address every obstacle and challenge arising. 
 Globally, consensus has been reached on addressing development 
through Agenda 2030 (United Nations 2015) and its seventeen Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), an extraordinary feat, including consensus on the 
call “to leave no one behind”. The SDGs have been successful in gaining 
attention, adoption and recognition as a shared framework with targets 
relevant across the world. Some countries have incorporated the goals and 
selected targets in their national planning, for example Germany. By mid-2020, 
169 out of 193 UN member states were due to have presented their Voluntary 
National Review to the UN High-Level Political Forum (HLPF). Numerous 
businesses likewise refer now to the SDGs in their corporate social 
responsibility reporting.   
 
1 The 1941 State of the Union speech by US President Roosevelt, spoke of four 
freedoms: freedoms of speech and of worship, and freedoms from want (i.e. extreme 
lack or need) and fear. Later the more concise yet more capacious three freedoms 
version appeared and was subsequently re-launched via 1990s UN human security 




 Many of these plans and reports paint an optimistic picture. Often 
though, their tone jars with many social, political, economic and environmental 
realities in the countries discussed. Income and wealth inequalities have soared; 
destructive levels of global heating, biodiversity loss and other environmental 
damage continue, and so do widespread violent conflicts and remilitarisation. 
Currently 71 million persons are forcibly displaced from their homes (UNHCR 
2020) and many of the 270 million international migrants (IOM 2020) have 
moved as a strategy to cope with insecurities they faced at home. The UN 
Secretary-General’s monitoring report warned even before COVID-19 that the 
world was off-track for achieving most SDGs (UN Secretary-General 2019). 
Since 2015, global governance has retrogressed on various fronts and in 
important locales, related to a rise of exclusivist nationalist ideologies.  
 With the COVID-19 pandemic, the disparities in the life chances that 
people have and the insecurities they face have become yet more evident. Not 
just affecting health, COVID-19 has far-reaching consequences in many 
aspects of daily lives, as a major threat to freedom from fear and want and 
freedom to live in dignity. It has exposed the stratified classist nature of 
national and global societies and laid bare the “violence of social inequality” 
(Piketty 2020). Marginalised individuals and communities are particularly 
vulnerable both to the virus and to losing their livelihood. The pandemic and 
the associated ramifying crises have heightened our awareness: of pervasive 
interconnections and consequent vulnerability, especially affecting many 
specific and marginal groups; of potential surprises and the challenge to 
respond to risks and uncertainty; of the need to think harder about fragility and 
promoting resilience; of the desirability of reserves and not only ‘just-in-time’ 
procurement; of the needs for intersectoral and international cooperation; and 
more. 
In this paper we present a case for activating and using a human 
security approach in going further with the 2030 Agenda. Human security 
thinking, a foundational strand in UN conceptual architecture (Jolly et al., 
2009) offers relevant intellectual, operational and inspirational grounding 
(Koehler et al. 2012). It can help sharpen ex ante diagnoses and prognoses and 
post-disasters responses and can illuminate the objective and subjective 
insecurities that fuel partisan populism and nationalism (Burgess et al. 2007). 
The paper looks at the case of Latvia as an interesting example to suggest 
potentials and challenges of incorporating a human security approach as 
partner to the SDGs in a policy process. Using also the COVID-19 pandemic 
as a case, we argue the necessity of combining the SDGs with a flexible and 
integrative human-centred perspective that helps prepare for and respond to 
the diverse conditions and evolving threats and challenges that arise locally, 
nationally and globally. This perspective can mobilize and focus many existing 
tools and ideas, including the principle of promoting human resilience. We give 
various suggestions that we hope will be useful in ongoing SDGs-review 
discussions. We use examples from, and aim to be relevant to, the full 





2   How can human security ideas support and 
complement the SDGs? 
Human security embodies the core promise of the 2030 Agenda: to leave no one 
behind (Guterres (UN Secretary-General] 2019, xi). 
The SDGs present an integrated set of global norms and goals that stimulate 
intra-, inter- and trans-national (including multi-lateral) cooperation (see e.g. 
Biermann et al. 2017). They rely on a wide variety of such alliances and have 
evident potential for inspiring new alliances and action thanks to their practical 
orientation, including the goals-targets-indicators format plus national and 
local-level flexibility in prioritizing, interpreting and extending the goals and 
targets and choosing means for action. But: first, in the situation of widespread 
post-2015 political reactions against global cooperation and inclusive 
governance, sustaining such actions and alliances requires fuller articulation of 
ideas and values that justify and motivate cooperation to pursue the goals. 
Second, the SDGs were designed to counteract policy silos, but can sometimes 
create their own silos. Third, they try to prioritise and coordinate activity in a 
presumed relatively stable world, to prevent drastic disruptions, more than 
being strongly oriented also to managing the shocks and turbulence that will 
and do arise. Human security thinking thus has important roles in relation to 
the SDGs – in understanding vulnerabilities, preparing for and responding to 
disruptions, supporting a necessary cross-sector perspective, motivating 
cooperation, and so in giving substance to the notion of “leaving no one 
behind”.  
2.1 General themes of human security analysis 
The UN General Assembly Resolution 66/290 of 2012 on human security 
stated that: 
...human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and 
addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to survival, livelihood and 
dignity of their people. Based on this, a common understanding on the notion of 
human security includes the following: 
(a) The right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and 
despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom 
from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their 
rights and fully develop their human potential; 
(b) Human security calls for people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and 
prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment 




(c) Human security recognizes the interlinkages between peace, development and 
human rights, and equally considers civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights...” (UN General Assembly 2012; from item 3).2 
These core ideas combine concerns with first, fulfilling priority human 
needs and preventing deprivation, and second, addressing the specific threats 
that in situations of vulnerability can damage attainment of important values. 
Where the two concerns intersect, they cover threats to survival, livelihood and 
dignity for persons in their everyday life, notably for the more marginalised 
(Gasper and Gómez 2014). The SDGs, like the MDGs, appear more oriented 
to dealing with basic deprivations and less oriented to understanding and 
responding to threats, although compared to the MDGs they include some 
steps in relation to threats arising from unsustainability.3 
 A similar formulation—in Sen (2014) and more concisely in O’Brien 
and Leichenko (2007)—describes human security analysis as follows. Such 
analysis combines an ‘equity dimension’—the  concerns for all persons, now 
and in the future, and with seeking to ensure their basic requirements—and a 
‘connectivity dimension’, the understanding that fulfilment of these basic 
priorities can be affected and threatened through the intersections of many 
factors that are conventionally often considered separately (Gasper and Gómez 
2014). The interconnections can vary situation-by-situation, as also to some 
extent can the interpretation of what are basic priorities. These two dimensions 
of human security thinking—equity and ‘connectivity’—deepen simpler 
‘development’ orientations that focus only on increasing aggregate output or 
on increasing the extent of valued attainable options for everyone. 
 
Important threats to important values in the lives of particular groups of people 
 
So, a human security approach studies what are threats to major valued aspects 
in people’s lives, who is affected and how, and how to try to prevent and/or 
counteract the threats and their effects. It “requires understanding the 
particular threats experienced by particular groups of people, [and therefore 
requires] the participation of those people in the analysis process. Threats to 
human security can exist at all levels of development. They can emerge slowly 
and silently or appear suddenly and dramatically” (Gómez and Gasper 2013, 2). 
 Understanding the range of threats experienced by particular groups of 
people comes from looking at their lives as wholes, considering connections, 
not looking only at a society as a set of ‘sectors’ that are considered separately 
from each other. A person’s life is lived as a whole, involving a plurality of 
 
2 The subsequent clauses of the Resolution’s formulation of the “common 
understanding” specify what the human security concept does not replace and does 
not include (e.g., amongst the latter, the Responsibility to Protect). 
3 The SDGs document, United Nations (2015), makes little or no use of the terms 
‘threat’, ‘hazard’, ‘downturn’, ‘downside’, ‘crisis’, or even ‘risk’ or ‘security’. It makes 
much more use of ‘vulnerable’, but almost always only as a partner term for ‘the poor’, 
and of ‘resilient’, which it applies more often to ecosystems, habitats, buildings, cities 




interwoven, interacting strands, not lived as x different parallel lives in x 
separate sectors. Arguably, “the concept of human security is able to capture 
[the broad] range of threats and risks” that a person faces in his/her single 
lived-as-a-whole life (Rubio-Marin and Estrada-Tanck, 2013, 238). This has 
been now well illustrated in many studies, including national and regional 
Human Development Reports that have used a human security approach.4 
 
Checklist of elements of human security analysis 
 
One can break down such analysis into a series of questions (cf. Gómez and 
Gasper 2013, Gómez et al. 2016) 
1. Whose security? Who are the agents considered? 
2. Security of what? Within the broad framework of “survival, livelihood 
and dignity”, which 
values will receive attention, at a particular time and place in a particu-
lar study?  
3. Security in respect to which threats?  
4. Security and threats as perceived by whom?  
5. To be responded to by whom? 
6. Using what means? For example, through (and/or by upgrading) the 
existing authorized 
institutions or by innovation? 
7. To what extent? What minimum thresholds and target levels should 
prevail? 
 
Whose security? (Qn. 1)  
 
The answer to “whose security?” is the security of people, rather than the 
security of national territory or armed forces or GDP or of only property-
holders. It includes everyone – leaving no-one behind. This commitment rests 
on principles of universal human rights, and implies that, since access and 
situations are skewed, special efforts need to be made for those individuals and 
communities who face disadvantage and exclusion, for example the income-
poorest, children, and/or people who are systematically excluded on the basis 
of gender, ethnicity, colour, caste, migration- or citizenship status, sexual 
orientation, and/or other identity vectors. Often these marginalisations 
intersect and overlap, making it difficult for the affected people to cope.  
 While “to leave no one behind” is used as a headline-summary of the 
SDGs, responsibility for action falls in the first instance to states. To fulfil the 
SDGs requires in each country the framework of a social contract between 
citizens – or in fact all residents – and the state. We use this term to refer not 
to any particular philosophical theory but to two mutually dependent sets of 
 
4 See e.g. two studies that reviewed many national and regional Human Development 
Reports that adopted a human security approach: 1) Jolly and Basu Ray, 2006 and 
2007; 2) Gómez et al., 2013 and 2016. For both studies, a longer report plus a shorter 




responsibilities: the responsibility of the state to assure, whether by delivery or 
other arrangements, an agreed set of public goods and services and other core 
values and valuables, and the responsibility of citizens to contribute to the 
functioning of the society by, among other things, legal compliance, including 
tax compliance, thereby making possible the state’s functioning (Loewe et al. 
2019; Loewe et al. 2020; UN Secretary-General 2020).  
 Marginalised groups and non-citizens are in practice often excluded 
from the discussion, because of prevalent power hierarchies. Most social 
services are difficult to access for marginalised groups, and at best only 
minimally accessible to non-citizens (e.g., for social protection see Kool and 
Nimeh, forthcoming). This leaves, for example, those immigrants who are 
engaged in daily labour, irregular immigrants and even asylum-seekers in an 
especially precarious position. Exclusion may result from legal restrictions and 
other societal structures and institutions, compounded by community-level 
exclusion processes (see, e.g., Kabeer, 2000; Koehler and Namala 2020). If we 
truly consider ‘people’s security’, we need to look at marginalised people and at 
citizens and non-citizens alike.  
 The current pandemic underlines how relatively privileged groups are 
sometimes vulnerable too. For example, the middle class working as small 
entrepreneurs or in occupations outside of government service and large 
companies has faced major economic setbacks (Sullivan, Warren and 
Westbrook 2020). This affects in turn many other people, for such groups 
sustained other jobs and paid into tax systems that support social protection.  
 
Which threats to which values/valuables? (Qns. 2 & 3) -- Respecting interconnections and 
thinking outside silos 
 
The 1994 global Human Development Report (HDR) gave an introductory list 
of seven realms of possibly threatened values/valuables: economic security; 
food access; health; environmental security; personal physical security; security 
of community life; and political security. The list serves as an initial ‘handrail’ 
that conveniently mirrors conventional administrative divisions. But studying 
people’s lives requires systems-thinking. People and societies exist within 
interconnected global and environmental systems each with their own limits 
and reactions; knock-on effects and feedbacks can magnify original shocks. In 
Japan’s ‘triple disaster’ of 2011, for example, a mega-earthquake led to a mega-
tsunami that led to a near mega-nuclear crisis at Fukushima. Such a scenario 
provides a hint of the much greater ramifying impacts that climate change 
could bring. There are limits and dangers then in trying to divide security into 
fixed, sharply distinct categories. As illustrated in the ‘triple disaster’ and the 
corona crisis, the conventional sets of at-risk valuables are often highly 
interconnected, so to analyse these crises and to respond only in seven (or 
seventeen) separate policy boxes can be a mistake. Human security analyses 
should help to counteract silo-ism, including by a focus on surprises, threats, 





Whose perceptions of security? (Qn. 4) 
 
Next to the seven realms of valuables set out above, psychological security 
must also be considered. While left out of the 1994 HDR list, it is central to 
well-being and for effective policies. Many authors and reports now study 
‘existential (in)security’ (e.g., Inglehart and Norris 2012, using data from the 
World Values Survey) – including feelings of (lack of) meaningfulness, 
relatedness and being treated with due dignity – as a (missing) basis for 
personal resilience and self-efficacy. It does not fit any standard policy 
portfolio or ministry or department title, for it represents not one more 
sectoral concern but the doppelganger partner to all concerns with ‘objective 
security’. Besides expert (or supposed expert) assessments of security, ordinary 
people’s security perceptions are fundamentally important. Sometimes they 
reflect realities which (supposed) experts have overlooked, misunderstood or 
ignored; but even when mistaken they still affect people’s behaviour and their 
cooperation or resistance. 
 A rich and fruitful field of research has opened up in human security 
studies on “people’s fears and perceptions, their felt insecurities, blind spots, 
what they cherish and what they feel is endangered” (Gasper and Gómez 2015, 
112).5 Policies that ignore people’s own perceptions of (in)security are 
problematic as they can in effect undermine the social contract between the 
citizen and the society. Table 1 suggests a range of scenarios. In most of them 
public and expert viewpoints are not aligned. Sometimes that is because expert 
views can be distorted, for example if inter-expert competition leads to over- 
accentuating the relevance of certain topics and the consequences of not 
Table 1 
























Unfounded public panics Society-wide panic 
Source: Gómez and Gasper 2013 
 
 
5 See, e.g., UNDP 1998, 2001, 2003, 2011, 2012a, 2013; Burgess et al. 2007; UNESCO 
2008; Hobson et al. 2014; Bacon and Hobson 2014. “Sensitivity to subjective aspects 
is central to thinking about human development from the vantage point of people, as 
opposed to states, and informing and enabling participatory decision-making and 




addressing them. Conversely, ‘public panics’ and ‘public blindness’ may both 
be fanned by (real) ‘fake news’ and new social media.6 
This returns us to the question of whose (in)security is recognised. As 
indicated previously, people experience threats differently depending on their 
position in society. There is then not only one set of relationships that needs to 
be maintained in the social contract (see e.g. UNDP 2016). If the effects of 
crises or policies are not adequately addressed, they can exacerbate existing 
hierarchical lines in society, which will bring knock-on effects; for example, 
perceptions of failure on the side of marginalised individuals, protests, or 
withdrawal of cooperation.  
 
Which policy agents, using which policy tools? (Qns. 5 & 6) – Principles of 
empowerment/agency and securitability/human resilience 
 
States and formal organisations cannot effectively handle all insecurities. 
Individual and group resilience are also key. So any policy response should 
consider not only external protection of people against threats but their own 
agency in coping. This emphasis in policy design, strongly articulated by the 
UN Commission on Human Security (the Ogata-Sen Commission: CHS 2003), 
connects to the concept of securitability which emerged independently in work 
in Latvia (UNDP 2003): people’s ability to contribute to their own security, 
including to avoid, cope with and overcome situations of insecurity. 
Securitability is close to the concept of resilience which came out of 
environmental studies, but it is more human and more far-reaching.7 It is now 
often referred to as human resilience. In this paper, we treat securitability and 
human resilience interchangeably. In addition, human security-oriented policy 
analysis and policy design connect closely to human rights-based approaches 
and can draw on their myriad strengths while complementing them in 
important ways (Estrada-Tanck 2016; Teitel 2011; Bilgic et al. 2020; Gasper 
2020a).  
2.2 How can human security ideas support and 
complement the SDGs? – specific suggestions 
SDGs reporting, analysis, and policy preparation can benefit from principles 
and methods that have been articulated and applied in human security studies 
(e.g., Martin and Owen 2014, Gasper 2020b) and elsewhere.  
 
6 The table does not cover all relevant issues, such as what is perceived as danger. For 
some people, decline in their status or erosion of identity, for example, are felt as 
major dangers, not necessarily recognised by technical experts. Also, ‘the public’ often 
needs to be disaggregated further; and beyond the table’s classification are the 
unknown unknowns which no one can estimate adequately. 
7 Securitability as per the full Latvian definition concerns the capacity to be and feel 
secure, avoid pervasive or sudden threats, retain a certain sense of security when such 
situations occur, and re-establish security and the sense of security when these have 





Asking people; comparing and contrasting perceptions of priority values, threats and security 
 
For specifying important threats to important valuables in the lives of 
particular groups of people, we must take into account different groups and 
hear peoples’ opinions. Studies must bring in broad sources of information and 
multiple perspectives, including ‘voices of the poor’, voices of the socially 
excluded, and, more broadly, voices of the people.8 Surveys of people’s security 
perceptions can be very useful (e.g., UNDP 2003, 2005, 2011, 2012a). They 
often reveal surprising discrepancies; for example, “levels of felt insecurity are 
similar throughout the [Latin American] region despite very different recorded 
or estimated incidences [of crime] (UNDP, 2013)” (Gasper and Gómez 2015, 
108). Frequent discrepancies are found also between people’s perceptions and 
the data produced by official statistical systems or independent research or the 
judgements of professionals. Understanding such discrepancies is important 
for effective (re-)design and attempted implementation of SDG programmes.  
 
Identifying ‘hotspots’, and using indexes  
 
Some specific methods include the following. First, people in difficult places 
should be supported and empowered to identify and report threats and risks. 
Second, regionally disaggregated studies of threats and of key risks and 
uncertainties should identify ‘hot-spots’ where many risks and problems are 
found together and might further fuel each other. This identification helps to 
direct attention towards priority localities, making a demanding policy agenda 
more manageable (Owen 2014). Third, a more ambitious tool for the same 
purposes—namely, capturing attention and then justifying concentrated 
actions in selected localities—is a human security index. Such indices based on 
objective/official data lead to instructive comparisons (and often striking 
contrasts) with local domestic production figures, the local HDIs, and indices 
based on local people’s perceptions (see e.g. Benin’s 2011 national HDR: 
UNDP 2011).9 As discussed above, no index is unquestionable or sufficient 
but good indexes help both to raise questions and to inform decision-making 
in the face of complexity. 
 
Using flexible focusing 
 
A further way to keep human security analyses manageable is to alternate (a) 
comprehensive comparative studies with (b) in-depth studies that focus on 
priorities suggested by the preceding comprehensive study (Gómez et al., 
2013). A ‘comprehensive’ study covers many ‘sectors’ and issues, but not in full 
 
8 Examples include the equity and sustainability field hearings of the NGO Initiative 
for Equality (Rogers and Balázs 2016) and the hotspot studies in India by the Centre 
for Social Equity and Inclusion (Namala and Rajesh 2019).  
9 See, e.g., Khan and Abdus Sabur (2011), Werthes et al. (2011) and Hastings (2013) 
for national-level indexes, and UNDP (2011) for sub-national indexes. Work is 




depth. Instead it seeks to identify sectors, issues or localities for further 
research and/or priority attention. It can assist in attempted comparison of 
different threats, comparison of the perceptions and the actualities of particular 
threats, better understanding of interlinkages (e.g. by scenarios work), and 
identification of hotspots (Gómez and Gasper 2013).  
 
Systematic comparisons between alternative policy routes  
 
A human security perspective leads one to compare how different responses to 
a threat affect the people whom one seeks to support, and also to compare 
how people benefit (or not) from prioritising different threats.10 So:  
 
1. A fundamental principle is that prevention is often better and cheaper 
than cure. In epidemics, for example, public health systems, preventive 
health programmes, protective equipment and basic sanitation should 
be primary. Serious prevention sometimes requires deep new causal 
analysis and considerable investment.  
2. Related to the priority of prevention, a focus on how people’s welfare 
is actually affected sometimes leads to questions about the relative 
degree of relevance and priority of conventional ‘security’ responses, 
such as overwhelming reliance on the military for national security (see 
e.g.: Kaldor and Beebe 2010; Human Security Study Group 2016) or 
concentration on high-cost elite metropolis-based facilities in health 
security.  
3. Prioritising prevention before cure involves setting priorities within 
sectors and, even harder, priorities between sectors. However, it can fit 
within the recommended procedure of alternating (a) periodic 
comprehensive comparative studies, that review what are relative 
priorities between sectors and sub-sectors/activities, and (b) 
concentration then for a period on the identified priority areas. (See 
e.g., Gómez et al. 2013.) 
To sum up, human security analysis can complement the SDGs agenda in 
several ways. First, it sharpens the SDG notion of leaving no one behind. 
Priority should go to those most strongly negatively affected. Second, it helps 
us question in particular contexts which threats are really worst for people and 
need to be prioritised, because they lead to human deaths or disabilities, or 
irreversible changes in ecosystems and/or cascade into multiple other threats, 
or perpetuate marginalisation. Third, it highlights that we must systematically 
ask what is going on in peoples’ perceptions that can inhibit or accelerate the 
SDGs. Fourth, highlighting human resilience, it promotes the agency of 
individuals and communities to help each other and themselves, including by 
claiming their rights and fulfilling corresponding responsibilities as per an 
agreed ‘social contract’. 
 We turn now to learning from concrete experiences: first, in the worlds 
of policy and practice in Latvia, where human security ideas have been 
 




discussed and used since around 2002; and second, from the COVID-19 crisis. 
Development concepts can be useful in policy processes in various ways. They 
can: (a) promote awareness and discussions about the future; (b) create 
demand for certain types of policy, for example by highlighting vulnerable 
individuals and shared risks; (c) be used to describe and assess current 
situations and policy, by providing criteria for focusing within complex systems 
and for data-collection in evaluation; (d) help in structuring and programming 
policy; and/or (e) provide motivation that supports all of these (cf. Debiel and 
Werthes 2006, Gasper 2020b). The Latvian case shows how a human security 




3   Human security, resilience and the SDGs –  
a perspective from Latvia, 1991-2020 
Latvia, a middle-income Baltic country, is a good case to examine regarding 
how ‘UN Ideas’ (Jolly et al. 2009) have helped to shape a nation. While rarely 
mentioned in the media of other countries, it interestingly illustrates pathways 
of human security and the SDGs in national governance. Latvia joined the UN 
in 1991 after regaining independence from Soviet rule. Some ‘UN Ideas’ won 
prominence and were deeply considered in national Human Development 
Reports (NHDRs). These elaborated and localised UN concepts, from poverty 
reduction (1996) to human security (2003) to human capability (2010). Human 
security ideas, understood especially as strengthening human resilience, entered 
national policy discussion spaces with the 2003 Report and became a guiding 
framework in the part of the National Development Plan 2014-2020 (Govt. of 
Latvia 2012, known as NDP2020) that set medium term goals toward 
achieving Latvia’s Sustainable Development Strategy to 2030 (Govt. of Latvia 
2010, known as Latvia2030). Once NDP2020 was programmed, the human 
security concept per se declined in use for reasons noted later, including because 
the SDGs became prominent from 2015 onwards. However, the COVID-19 
crisis has renewed interest in human resilience.  
 
Human Security through Strengthening Resilience – the 2003 NHDR 
 
The Latvian Human Development Report on Human Security (2003) gained 
international attention when it received the 2004 UNDP Human Development 
Award for Excellence. The Report provided new depth to UN work on human 
security. Its innovativeness arose through collaboration between Latvian 
experts from economics, political science, sociology, psychology, social 
psychology, government and management. It argued that besides addressing 
specific threats, individuals and society as a whole needed to more generally 
strengthen their abilities, first, to prevent or reduce potential threats, whether 
sudden or pervasive, and second, when they occur, to cope with them and 
mitigate their consequences. The Report discussed how this could be done by 
strengthening five ‘securitability’ factors for most people, namely: 1) economic 
security (sufficient and predictable income), 2) individual personal 
characteristics, 3) close positive interpersonal relations, 4) the ability to 
cooperate between people, and 5) the ability/capacity to trust and cooperate 
with government institutions and international organisations (UNDP 2003). 
These factors reflect the idea that people always exist as individuals but within 
a series of progressively wider circles – family, community, national, and 
international (Figure 1). More levels can be specified. If people feel safe, they 
identify and cooperate through these circles. If they do not feel attachment or 
belonging at one or more of these levels, they perceive them not as extensions 






Visualisation of levels of human security 
 
Source: UNDP, 2003 
 
Individual agency is therefore considered of key importance, including 
a person’s feeling that he/she can effect change. The same goes in regard to 
communities, organisations and the country. Individual security strategies can 
help in developing resilience, plus people are more resilient if they cooperate in 
an active civil society. However, if a person or group of people has gone below 
a certain threshold, assistance is needed, from a relevant ‘security constellation’ 
– a configuration of security providers with coordinated strategies. Finally, the 
2003 NHDR advised that policy makers should prioritise addressing people 
with low resilience and should consider subjective perceptions as well as 
objective realities since both influence behaviour.  
 
Entry of Sustainable Development and later of Human Security into Latvian Policy 
Planning  
 
Latvia2030, the Sustainable Development Strategy to 2030, completed in 2010, 
was a milestone in synthesising society’s needs by harnessing the UN idea of 
sustainable development. Created from 2007 through a nation-wide 
participatory process, Latvia2030 is considered close to a social contract. All 
national development plans and sectoral planning documents must now be 
geared towards achieving it. Within this frame, human security thinking in the 
form of human resilience as concept and policy priority was used from 2012 in 
the National Development Plan 2014-2020. The Plan was influenced by the 
2008-2012 financial crisis that caused economic hardship and a mass exodus to 
other countries. It aimed to promote economic competitiveness, human 
resilience, and equal conditions throughout Latvia. The Plan specified five 
areas for strengthening human resilience, based on the factors outlined in the 
2003 NHDR: 1) decent work, and support for those people unable to work; 2) 
creating stability in childhood and close personal relations; then two areas that 
shape individual characteristics: 3) health and 4) education; and lastly, 5) 
promoting active engagement in society and sense of belonging to Latvia. The 
National Employment Agency’s work on profiling clients to provide 
personalised services to facilitate employability is an example of strengthening 
individual security strategies. Creation of coordinated security strategies between 




Welfare and its partners in creating a model for integrated multi-institutional 
and community response in cases of violence against women. Unusually, in its 
section on promoting engagement of society and sense of belonging, 
NDP2020 set measurable goals for advancing mutual trust among the 
population and also trust in the political system.  
 
Entry of the Sustainable Development Goals 
 
The Latvia2030 strategy considerably predated the SDGs, and NDP2020 had 
entered into force a year before the global Agenda 2030 and SDGs came 
strongly to the government’s attention in 2015. However, the Agenda and 
SDGs have been used in Latvia in at least two ways – they have created 
demand for action in certain policy areas and they are used to benchmark 
Latvia’s policies. Comparisons between the national plans and the global 
agenda revealed only limited gaps. Mapping the 17 SDGs and their 169 targets 
against the totality of government policy outcome indicators showed that the 
SDGs are addressed in nearly all cases. They are also kept on the public agenda 
by NGOs and academic institutions that have international networks. A 
strength of the SDGs, confided one parliamentarian, is that they give an 
international lingua franca for policy debates. Further, the 2018 Voluntary 
National Review, co-created by the centre of government, ministries, local 
government authorities and other stakeholders, stimulated awareness and 
discussions around the SDGs and built consensus on their values and 
principles, including ‘to leave no one behind’. To date, however, there has been 
little discussion on using the 2030 Agenda to make difficult choices. The norm 
to ensure multi-stakeholder engagement has brought a push to broaden the 
2021-2027 National Development Plan’s scope rather than narrow it, which 
may defer the tough choices that inevitably result from limited financing, at 
least until final-hour budget discussions. The draft 2021-27 Plan (NDP 2027) is 
now based also on the ‘quality of life’ concept, which has become seen by 
opinion-makers as attractively positive and forward-looking.  
 
Where is human security now? 
 
Because the post-2008 financial crisis had left limited resources to distribute, 
the National Development Plan 2014-2020 used the concept of human 
resilience to guide decision-making in programming and financing. The new 
NDP2027, although framed in terms of quality of life, still contains actions 
strengthening human resilience, without using the term ‘human security’. The 
substantive human security content is in fact strengthened. The 16 areas named 
in NDP2027 include “improving psychological and emotional well-being”, 
“strengthening the role of the family”, “social inclusion”, “work and income”, 
“strengthening social cohesion (mutual trust)”, and “justice and good 
governance (trust in the justice system and in government)” as well as 
“security”. One envisaged activity is a new service with combined educational, 
medical and psychological support to aid early identification of psychological 





Perceived strengths and limitations of using SDGs and human security ideas and formats  
 
The SDGs contribute to discussions in Latvia about the future. They help to 
assess the trajectory of existing and planned action, though their potential 
seems limited for structuring and programming action. First, the SDGs seem 
to be articulated as all equally priorities, giving little guidance on phasing when 
choices must be made. Second, Agenda 2030 is not an agile framework for 
dealing with emerging risks and threats. Third, the SDGs currently do not 
address perceptions. In all three respects—prioritizing; preparing for, changing 
and responding to shocks and crises; taking perceptions seriously—attention to 
human security can help. 
 In terms of prioritizing and agile response, Latvia’s human resilience 
approach and support measures have helped people become better able to 
cope with changes. The approach has shown its worth during the COVID-19 
crisis where agility has been of the utmost importance (Section 4 below), and 
will be useful in response to future threats too. In regard to perceptions: these 
often determine the success of policies, perhaps increasingly so given the risks 
of misinformation that now exist online. The human security discourse in 
Latvia has here helped to promote an understanding that: (a) people can create 
individual strategies, cooperate with each other and work within trusting 
relationships with their governments and the international community, if they 
live free of fear and free of want; and (b) the digital era gives us much greater 
opportunity to create personalised and customised support from multiple 
providers, to strengthen resilience where it has been compromised. 
 Several challenges or limitations have also been encountered in practice 
in Latvia. First, in contrast to SDGs’ focusing on the positive, human security 
analyses can be resisted by some audiences, perceived and presented as risk-
avoidance oriented, carrying a defensive connotation rather than boldly 
positive. Second, concerns with perceptions are not always easy to convert into 
simple planning tools and targets; perceptions are hard to reliably quantify or 
to clearly relate to behaviour. Thirdly, changes in actual and felt security and 
resilience can be hard to attribute to specific policy measures, making policy 
evaluation more difficult. We comment in our Conclusions section on some 






4   Learning from COVID-19, with and for human security 
analysis 
The SDGs provide a valuable common framework of policy goals, a lingua 
franca for global cooperation and global and intra-national accountability. We 
have suggested, in general terms and with specifics from Latvia, that the SDGs 
framework should be complemented by human security analysis, including for: 
first, finer-tuned investigation of what affects particular population groups in 
pursuit of the ambition ‘to leave no one behind’; second, understanding, 
preparing for and responding in complex crises, including but certainly not 
restricted to those that involve physical violence; and third, sensitivity to the 
psychological and perceptual dimensions of security and well-being, for 
without that, policy will fail. The COVID-19 crisis illustrates all these 
complexities.  
In regard to the first point, differential vulnerabilities, research into the 
virus so far has indicated that greater age and preexisting health challenges and 
behaviours make some people particularly vulnerable. Beyond that, as with 
other diseases, these ‘biological’ factors are compounded by the social 
determinants of health – factors such as location, housing, incomes, access to 
food, health services and education-level (cf. Dahlgren and Whitehead 1991). 
In the case of a major pandemic like this, the social determinants ramify very 
far because the pandemic causes comprehensive economic and social harms, 
that hit weaker groups far harder. We will discuss those ramifying effects after 
attention to the second point, the requirements for more adequate 
preparedness and their non-fulfilment in many countries, including amongst 
the richest. 
 
Responses in the COVID-19 pandemic: on disaster (un)preparedness  
 
In the first instance the pandemic is about health insecurity and the associated 
fears. After the virus and then its structure were identified and made public 
during January, WHO declared a Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern (PHEIC) on 30 January 2020. Most countries were seriously 
unprepared to respond, but some like Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea 
took rapid and effective action. We have seen from such cases, and from 
middle-income territories such as Thailand, Vietnam and even Kerala, the 
major difference made by rapid response based on learning from earlier 
epidemics. Even a middle-income country like Latvia, not recently exposed to 
a closely similar epidemic, responded effectively in many important ways. After 
Latvia’s state of emergency was declared on March 12, communications about 
the situation came in simple messages from the prime minister and a health 
minister, using evidently sincere and direct language. The government 
immediately set up a one-stop information portal, published all decisions and 




some matters, Latvia has arguably reaped considerable returns from its earlier 
investments in promoting human resilience and societal trust. It was ranked 
second amongst OECD countries, behind only South Korea, on the 
effectiveness of its COVID-19 response (Sachs et al. 2020). 
In contrast, the UK had preparatory warnings of possible major virus 
outbreaks on several occasions in earlier years, most recently in 2019, when the 
government received an extensive warning in the 2019 National Security Risk 
Assessment. This highlighted a scenario of an influenza-type virus pandemic. 
The scenario was given the highest seriousness rating for expected negative 
impact, ‘Catastrophic’ (5 out of 5), a likelihood rating of ‘Medium’, and an 
overall risk rating of ‘Very High’. However, the major recommendations were 
not acted on by a government preoccupied with Brexit and related policy 
rhetoric. An existing plan for national pandemic preparation had also not been 
implemented (Hopkins 2020). No action was taken and even stocks of 
personal protective equipment (PPE) were run down as a cost-saving measure. 
After the epidemic hit the UK, the government introduced lockdown measures 
but substantially later than other European countries. By May 1st, the UK had 
around 175,000 confirmed cases and some 28,000 persons had died; by June 
29th, about 312.000 and almost 44,000 respectively.11  
 In the US the administrations of Presidents Bush and Obama had 
prepared action plans for pandemics, including a plan delivered to incoming 
President Trump at the end of 2016. But neglect prevailed thereafter, including 
closure of the pandemic preventive unit in the National Security Council in 
March 2018. The US Centers for Disease Control publicly warned of a new 
virus in China on 12th January 2020 and thereafter on several occasions in 
January and February US public health officials warned the President in his 
daily briefings. He chose to make a series of dismissive public statements. By 
July 20th 2020 there were almost 4 million confirmed cases, and 143,000 
identified (i.e. tested) deaths in the US; by October 27th, 8.7 million cases and 
225,000 deaths.  
 
Human insecurity: the differential ‘secondary’ impacts 
 
In the second instance, the crisis is about insecurities in income, employment 
and often food. Perhaps most countries adopted a lock-down and isolation 
response. In the formal economy, for many middle-class professionals, this 
meant work-from-home with at most somewhat reduced productivity; but for 
workers in manufacturing and services it meant continuing to work at personal 
health risk, or going on furlough with reduced pay, or being dismissed. Global 
unemployment has jumped to levels not seen since the 1930s. The ILO 
estimated that already as of late April 305 million full-time jobs had been lost 
(ILO 2020, 4). 
 
11 WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard. On the UK’s series of weaknesses and 






Over 60% of the global workforce, 2 billion people, work in the 
informal economy. Estimates in May suggested that in this group already 
almost 1.6 billion had been significantly impacted by the COVID-19 crisis 
(ILO May 2020, 1). They need income support to survive and feed their 
families since almost all lack social protection, even at a minimal level. In 
countries where many informal workers are migrants, there has been a forced 
exodus back to home countries or from urban centres to villages of origin. 
This has often led to immediate destitution, as many lack substantial savings. 
Families lose remittance incomes on which they are often economically 
dependent.  
In the care economy, the gendered division of labour makes the bulk 
of care responsibilities fall to women (Koehler 2015). In numerous respects, 
the pandemic and lockdowns have multiplied the care work burden as the 
entire family is at home, some members may fall ill, and out-of-school children 
require more attention and learning support (UN Women 2020). Men face a 
greater direct health threat though, plus possibly various indirect physical and 
psychological health impacts. 
Regarding children, 1.5 billion children have been out of school as a 
consequence of school closures. Some can follow home schooling, but 1 
billion people do not have electricity at home, and there is an enormous divide, 
digitally and otherwise, between but also within rich and low-income countries. 
Many lower income households have neither the internet connection and 
computers nor the life-skills and background needed for home-schooling. 
There is a risk that some children will not return to school when these reopen, 
as was observed for girl children after other crises (UNICEF 2020). Though 
the direct impact of the virus on children seems to be small, the indirect 
impacts of lockdown, economic setbacks and recession are likely to be major, 
sometimes catastrophic, in the medium and even longer term, especially in 
poorer countries (Cornia et al. 2020). While nationals are being hit hard, 
migrants and other non-citizens are hit still harder.  
In Latvia, many steps were taken promptly in March to ensure 
sufficient and predictable income, including support via companies to their 
employees, extensions of status and benefits for the unemployed, and 
increased family benefits. Financing was given to both public and commercial 
media, to ensure no disruption in passage of useful information to the 
population; and public service announcements, repeated at prime times, 
informed people staying at home what to do if domestic violence is an issue. 
Citizens, NGOs and private businesses started helping vulnerable groups. An 
online platform, #stayathome, emerged to connect those who need support 
and volunteers willing to help. As Latvia transitioned into a recovery phase, the 
network evolved into #easytohelp.  
This is not to say that everything was going smoothly in Latvia. There 
will be consequences from the decrease in non-emergency health services; 
home-schooling has been a challenge, especially for parents with low education 
levels; and more. Still, government action has mostly increased trust. 




of power. As the Head of the National Police said, the police have been on the 
streets to advise people on protecting themselves, not to punish them. This 
goodwill was largely reciprocated. Many people remain concerned about 
having sufficient income and have been experiencing other insecurities. 
However, many groups who were considered in advance to be vulnerable – 
persons with disabilities, the homeless, persons with low incomes – proved to 
have or gain channels of support. Still, there are groups that experience special 
difficulties, for example children on the autism spectrum who need a daily 
routine that has been interrupted, or persons with multiple vulnerabilities, such 
as single parents with low incomes and essential work who cannot stay to 
home-school their children. Another new vulnerable group includes (former) 
employers and employees in sectors that are suddenly without work or will not 
exist in the future.  
Overall, Latvia’s COVID-19 experience seems to have built on its earlier 
investments towards human resilience and to be further augmenting that. 
People appear to be supporting each other more and the government has 
become more strongly responsive to needs in society. Before approving the 
NDP2027 the Parliament directed the government to urgently address 
healthcare support, including for individuals and households most at risk. A 
big challenge remains in identifying and addressing the specific needs of 
specific vulnerable groups, especially the newly vulnerable.  
 
Pointers for better (health) disaster preparedness  
 
Future COVID-19 type epidemics are quite likely.12 New viruses from 
zoonosis (disease transmission from animals to humans) are expected to 
increase as the habitat areas of wild animals continue to be encroached on. 
Following the 2002-04 SARS epidemic that involved a similar corona virus, 
reports to WHO had predicted more such epidemics in the fairly near future.13 
Whereas for COVID-19, genetic sequencing technology allowed rapid 
identification of the exact nature of the virus and rapid roll-out in China and 
neighbouring countries of large-scale diagnostic testing, the world might not be 
so fortunate in regard to other challenges. 
 The responses to the SARS epidemic and the current COVID-19 
pandemic must be studied further for lessons in relation to disaster 
preparedness. Already evident are the elementary but fundamental principles 
of, first, prioritizing preventive actions and, second, building preparedness to 
rapidly respond. The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, adopted 
 
12 See e.g. “there are a lot of coronaviruses in bats and a lot of SARS-like 
coronaviruses similar to this one and the original SARS” – interview with Dr. 
Anthony Fehr, University of Kansas: https://www.kansascitymag.com/heres-what-could-have-
stopped-the-covid-19-epidemic-according-to-a-kansas-coronavirus-expert/ . 
13 See e.g. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/25/ourselves-scientist-says-human-
intrusion-nature-pandemic-aoe . See also 
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/07/coronavirus-epidemic-prediction-policy-
advice-121172 on such predictions and an analysis of required policy preparations 




in 2015 by the UN General Assembly, enunciates relevant principles for a 
range of risks to human security, beyond epidemics.14 These Sendai principles 
highlight the need for surge capacity in regard to health, food and education. 
The WHO too has advised continuously on the problematic state of epidemic 
and disaster preparedness. One can compare these preparations with those 
routinely made by most countries for military security: continuous research and 
monitoring, rapid response readiness and contingency plans, stockpiling of key 
equipment, national and international response exercises, periodic reviews of 
government policy in which ministers are held accountable. One sees gross 
imbalances between the (possibly excessive) resources and organization 
commonly allocated to military preparations and those allocated to preventing 
and countering health and other risks. In most countries, a shift of resources 
would greatly enhance human security as a whole (see e.g. UNDP 2012b). Box 
1 suggests a list of basics for health crisis preparedness.   
 
Box 1:  Priorities for Health Crises Preparedness 
1. Sound system of public health rooted in the ethos of UHC (Universal 
Health Coverage) 
2. Building surge capacity and ensuring that it is continuously available for 
medical professionals, care-staff, and administrators  
3. Advance stockpiling of equipment, medication, supplies, food  
4. Rapid-response-planning must be in place 
5. Research facilities to be ready to monitor, rapidly investigate and 
analyse outbreaks as new health crises emerge, and to work on 
treatments and vaccines to prevent and control them 
6. Routine exercises to ensure readiness at national and local levels 
7. Adequate financial support from the government for well-endowed 
disaster preparedness, from prevention to recovery, and for public 
health systems that are at surge capacity level  
8. Rapid and transparent evidence-guided leadership from government, 
experts from all disciplines, and avenues for public consultations 
9. Built-in ex-ante attention to those individuals and groups facing the 
highest levels of insecurity due to multiple forms of marginalisation 
10. Due recognition and higher attention given to the care economy in 
responding to crises.  
 
Is it excessive to have a public health system that is oversized for normal 
burdens of disease? We suggest not. First, there is a right to health services for 
all in the UDHR, made binding in article 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), plus the commitment in SDG 3.8 
to universal health coverage. Second, one can compare these capacity choices 
to decisions in other areas. Developed countries keep their electricity grids at 
peak capacity at all times (UNCTAD 2019). On most days the peak is not 
reached but it is available if needed. Consumers pay via higher electricity costs 






public policy choice. A similar level of consciously incurred costs to guarantee 
preparedness for peaks, surges and pandemics is more widely appropriate in 
disaster preparedness. 
The widespread disruption of life in response to COVID-19 might 
open a window for broader action against other forms of human insecurities. 
In the Latvia case, for example, the pandemic has propelled forward the 
NDP2027 and SDG initiatives toward an innovative and climate-friendly 
economy, including in digitalisation and R&D. Distance work, distance 
education, and the increase in public and private services available online that 
the crisis has brought about should help decrease greenhouse gas emissions. In 
all countries, this sort of broader preparation should start before the window 




5 Conclusions: Making the SDGs—and people and 
societies—more resilient 
The grand policy agenda of the SDGs is inevitably shaken by events. It needs 
to be stirred so that countries and the international community accelerate 
action as promised for a “decade of action” to achieve the Goals by 2030 (UN 
General Assembly 2019). For this it needs an injection of supportive and 
supplementary tools. Human security thinking and experience have important 
roles to play here – for understanding vulnerabilities, preparing for and 
responding to disruptions, motivating cooperation, and supporting the 
necessary cross-sector perspective.  
 Human security analysis combines a concern for fulfilment of rightful 
priority needs for all with a systematic attention to the threats to fulfilment that 
can arise and sometimes escalate, including due to the interplay of many 
interconnected factors as we see for example in the COVID-19 crisis. Study of 
the range and interactions of threat factors is part of a focus on the reality of 
people’s lives, including on their perceptions, fears, ‘local knowledge’ and 
capacities. A human security perspective stresses consultation, attention to 
these fears and perceptions, and policy emphases on basic needs support, 
empowerment, promoting human resilience and transcending policy silos, in 
order to better understand and assist people as they face the challenges and 
complexities in their lives.  
 We saw that in contrast to the SDGs’ focus on vistas of progress, or to 
discourses of well-being, human security analyses can be resisted by some 
audiences, perhaps especially some politicians, being viewed as defensive rather 
than boldly optimistic. But the perspectives are necessary partners. Possibly the 
COVID-19 crisis, which may conceivably be a forerunner of other mega-crises, 
will encourage a balanced approach, in which the positive ambition of the 
SDGs is appropriately married to what Amartya Sen has called the “cautious 
and individually articulated perspective” of human security that gives sober 
attention to the real lives of real vulnerable persons (Sen 2015, 154).   
  
Some summary messages and suggestions arising from the paper are offered 
below. 
 
Suggestions especially for the UN: 
1. Human security analysis (as endorsed in General Assembly Resolution 
66/290 of 2012) is required in pursuing the 2030 Agenda commitment that 
no-one be left behind.  
2. A human security approach is a necessary partner for the SDGs frame-
work, to help to more systematically recognise and address threats and risks that can 
undermine the 2030 Agenda and the three freedoms. 
3. Correspondingly, work in the UN system on SDGs, disaster risk reduction, 
human development and human security should be well integrated, under 




Suggestions especially for governments: 
1. Adding a human security lens to the SDGs supports a fundamental change 
in thinking. Policymakers and local leaders, and also journalists and media-
people, need to shift from thinking of security overwhelmingly in military 
and policing terms to thinking in terms of human security, where threats to 
people from many causes are placed at the centre. 
2. People with multiple vulnerabilities need coordinated responses, 
personalised as far as possible to their specific combination of risk factors, to 
ensure results. This approach lets governments spend for services that 
better achieve results, rather than acting according to a person’s attribution 
to a specific group in terms of a single criterion. 
3. Many relevant research and policy tools can be mobilized for this work. Some 
emphasised in this paper (especially Section 2) are: human security indexes 
and identification of ‘hotspots’, to help focus priority attention; collection 
and use of information on perceived insecurities, for comparison with expert 
estimates and measures; scenarios analyses; periodic comparisons of the 
human effectiveness of different actions (e.g., in terms of quality-adjusted 
life-years); and flexibility in focusing, partly varying over time through the 
alternation of periodic comparative multi-sector studies and subsequent 
focus on identified current priorities.   
4. States need to think systematically how to ensure adequate preparation and 
response in times of crises, drawing on the Sendai framework. The COVID-19 
crisis (see Section 4) has shown how lack of prevention plus frequently 
slow response action can cause hundreds of thousands of deaths and 
disrupt billions of lives. Comparison across countries shows that more 
serious attention to human security and human resilience, including 
through prior preventive actions, would have avoided much of this. In the 
foreseeable future, global overheating, climate change and climate chaos 
are likely to generate considerably greater challenges. 
5. A human security approach embraces actions to strengthen human resilience. 
For example, school education needs to build early foundations in all 
sections of the population. Preventive action should go beyond the 
physical to encompass also perceptions, risks to mental health and 
extremes of anxiety.  
Suggestions especially for the policy research community:  
1. Much relevant experience, reflection and practical knowledge for using a human security 
perspective and for refining the approach exist, some of it available in scientific 
literature (e.g., Owen ed. 2013) but some not. We need to extend and better 
share research on human security. Latvia is an example of a country which has 
partly used a human security approach since 2010, drawing on extensive 
research since at least 2002. This is relatively little known and so was 
discussed here in some detail (Section 3). Such examples should be studied 
and debated more, to assess what is of wider relevance and applicability. 
2. Synthesis of work on human security indicators and indices is probably one 
priority, together with linking and comparing with related indicators and 





3. Various country experiences, including in the current COVID-19 crisis, 
suggest how a human security-oriented policy approach can promote and 
strengthen a constructive social contract (subsection 2.1, qn. 1); including by 
articulating and supporting fulfilment of fundamental rights and 
responsibilities for all, and by giving attention to people’s perceptions and 
fears. Research on this theme is another priority. 
4. Societal preparedness for major threats to human security requires changes 
in our concepts, research, communication and public discussion, planning 
and resource allocation. We noted some of the challenges that will be 
encountered. For example, perceptions are sometimes hard to reliably 
quantify or to clearly relate to behaviour, so concerns with perceptions can 
be difficult to convert into simple planning tools and targets. Besides 
indicating areas for ongoing research, we note though that major advances 
exist already in collecting, analysing and using such information.15  
 
Overall, while much work is required, the available research and experiences 
already strongly indicate the viability and value of employing, applying and 
adapting many human security ideas and tools in support of the 2030 Agenda 
and the SDGs.  
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